Bangladesh Open Source Intelligence Monitors

"Grassroot Open Source Intelligence can include information we get from books, magazines, the Web, music, movies and other open sources. These information sources often overlap and intermix. Valuable intelligence can be found in a very wide range of people, media and other sources. Keep your eyes and mind open for good grassroots intelligence. The human race needs all the intelligence we can get our hands on." Steve Hammons

Saturday, 4 July 2009

Bangladesh: 'Secret deal' unravels amidst confusion in the Army

M. Shahidul Islam

The recent claim by the deputy leader of the House, Sajeda Chowdhury, that 'Sheikh Hasina's food was poisoned while being in captivity in the special prison during the emergency rule' is having a quiet snowballing effect in politics as well as in the services of the Republic.

"It's a dangerous game that could end up with more bloodshed," cautioned one senior retired officer of the army while a reliable source confirmed that the information relating to poisoning of Sheikh Hasina's food came from a source in the Election Commission (EC). "One of the election commissioners wanted to confirm the information during a private dinner on June 25 which was attended by a former senior officer of the DGFI, who once oversaw the imprisoned VVIPs' welfare matters during the emergency rule. Other guests attending the dinner could not realize the importance of the conversation until Awami League (AL) leader Sajeda Chowdhury disclosed the news to the public 48 hours later", the source added. 

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a DGFI officer said, "To be honest, the opposite is true. In fact, the then DG, Maj. Gen. Golam Mohammed, and then Brig. Gen. A T M Amin, had ensured that the former PM (Hasina) was treated in the most respectable and secured manner. A T M Amin even carried special food for Sheikh Hasina on many occasions."

According to the officer, the scenario in the captivity further improved since April 2008, due to what he said, "stitching of a political deal in mid-March 2008 between the military's higher command and the AL leadership." The deal not only ensured Sheikh Hasina's safety and eventual release, all concerned officers were also told not to pursue any more anti-corruption cases against AL leaders. 

"All of a sudden, I was surprised to see Brig. Gen. ATM Amin busy in buying Tangail saree for Sheikh Hasina, while Gen. Golam Mohammed got intensely involved in a series of secret meetings with an important AL leader, H T Imam," the officer explained.

Another source confides, since the departure of Maj. Gen Masud Uddin from the national anti-corruption coordination cell (under AFD) and the resumption of that job by then Brig. Gen. Akbar, the entire scheme of anti-corruption drive stalled and a facade of blatant partisan favouritism started in favour of the AL and against the BNP.
   
Withdrawal syndrome

This version was further attested by another former DGFI officer who said, I asked the chief (Gen. Moeen) what was going on. He responded almost philosophically and said, "Don't you withdraw and regroup in battles? This is the same thing." Indeed a strong nexus between the then chief and two successive intelligence heads had turned, what until then (March 2008) was a neutral and patriotic drive to cleanse the nation of corrupt elements, into a partisan political agenda.

Meanwhile, the sudden sacking last week without any valid reason of Brig. Gen. Azmi is creating a stir within the armed forces and outside. Brig. Gen. Azmi is one of the brightest officers, having secured both the coveted Sword of Honour and the Academic Gold Medal from the military academy (BMA). One of his colleagues said in anger, "He has been sacked because he's the son of Golam Azam."

Many national security experts and former military officers believe the 'wish list' of the Government is getting so big and so sweeping that it would end up soon with destruction of morale of the country's armed forces. Brig. Gen. Azmi's sacking follows the recent sacking of 10 other officers from the army for having raised questions about how the military command had handled the BDR rebellion, and, at least three other Brig. Gen(s), and over two dozens officers - ranging from Captain to Colonel- are leaving jobs voluntarily within weeks.  

At least 150 other voluntary resignation applications (known as Appendix-J) have been pending with authorities since the AL-led Government's coming to power, according to sources. "By the time the Government feels satisfied, the blanket could be empty of all fabrics," commented another officer who had retired from the BDR only weeks before the rebellion in February.
   
A 'cooked up' story

This scribe failed to communicate with Maj. Gen ATM Amin to further authenticate the veracity of what has now become the infamous and the most curious 'poison story'. Amin was very close to Sheikh Hasina during her period of captivity and his file for premature retirement was sent back by the PM on three different occasions until a DGFI report falsely implicated him in March for carrying a pistol in the BDR ceremony of February 24, 2009 where the PM was present. The 'cooked up' pistol- carrying- story led to his forced retirement.

Bari speaks out

Of the other two senior DGFI officers of the emergency - era, (excluding then DG, Maj. Gen. Golam Mohammed), Brig. Gen. Bari was removed from his post and sent as defence attach to Washington few months before the election while Brig. Gen. Amin promoted as Maj. Gen., was transferred as DG of the Ansar & VDP before being attached to the foreign ministry in late March, and, finally sent to premature retirement. The sudden removal of the two senior officers from the DGFI just prior to the election is viewed by many as the evidence of their neutral political stance and signs of their dissent to the alleged election tampering blue print.

When contacted, Brig. Gen. Bari refuted the veracity of Hasina's food poison story, but confessed to having been asked by superior officers not to pursue corruption cases against AL stalwarts following what he too dubbed as a 'deal making between the military command and the AL prior to the election in December 2008.' Bari said, "they (deal makers) are opportunists and have sold out the nation's interests by being political and partisan."

Now in the USA, Bari has been called back by the AL-led Government only five months after he took charge as the defence adviser at the Bangladesh Embassy in Washington DC. He refused to comply. On other hand, Gen. Amin's closeness with the PM during the time of her captivity has led to uncertainty about his retirement, no one being sure as yet whether he is retired, or still in service. Perturbed by such developments, one observer said, "If you wish to preserve the independence of this country, ensure first that the armed forces in particular - and the bureaucracy in general - learn to remain loyal to the nation, not to any particular political party.

Link

Thursday, 25 June 2009

Bangladesh: Tipaimukh Dam and Indian Envoy's Audacious Remarks

Indian High Commissioner Pinak seating next to Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dip Mono

BY Dr K M A Malik, UK

The diplomatic heads of foreign embassies in Dhaka, particularly those of India, USA, EU, have often taken advantage of a weak political establishment of Bangladesh and indulged in activities unbecoming of proper diplomatic conventions and norms. They have taken partisan positions in respect of internal politics, favouring one political party against another, fomenting dissension and discord, and aggravating political crises. This they have done in the name of friendship to Bangladesh, but in reality the policy reflected a neo-colonial attitude on the part of powerful nations towards a relatively weak third world country struggling to protect its independence and to improve the socio-economic conditions of its people.

Bangladesh seems to be country where the foreign diplomats feel free to make public comments on each and every topic, without any consideration for the honour, dignity and sovereignty of the host country. The US and EU diplomats are relatively sophisticated not to use very crude words, although their purpose is to control the overall political direction of the country. But the diplomats from New Delhi who represent a new imperialist power in South Asia do not mince words about what Bangladesh should or should not do. The latest comments by Mr. Pinak R. Chakravarty, Indian High Commissioner in Dhaka, in a meeting of the so-called Bangladesh-India Friendship Society, is only an additional example of the policy of contempt Indian rulers hold for Bangladesh.

So what are the comments by Mr Chakravarty that are unacceptable to the people of Bangladesh? According to The Bangladesh Today (June 23, 2009) the Indian High Commissioner denied that there is any international law to stop the Tipaimukh Dam project [1]. Obviously, this is an expression of extreme arrogance and reflects the attitude of a bully. Whether there is any specific international written law, signed by both Bangladesh and India, is not the main point. The point is whether an upper riparian country has the monopoly over the water of a river that obstructs or reduces its flow into the lower riparian country to injure the latter's legitimate interests.

There are hundreds of examples all over the world where the water flows as well as the quality of water in international rivers have been jointly negotiated and agreed upon by the parties concerned so as not to derive unilateral advantages for one country and loss for another country. Why India has not bothered to involve Bangladesh in serious negotiations before any of its projects in international rivers? The answer probably lies in the mindset of New Delhi rulers that Bangladesh is not an independent country and that India's bigger size, greater economic, military and diplomatic might empower them to do whatever they wish to do in respect of the much smaller and weaker neighbour even it faces destruction and devastation. This type of policy is clearly unfair, immoral, and inconsistent with international norms and can be pursued only by a rogue power.

According to the news item in The Bangladesh Today referred to above, Mr. Chakravarty sharply criticised people who said the Tipaimukh dam would cause environmental disasters in the greater Sylhet region in Bangladesh. "It is unfortunate that there are some so-called water experts who make comments without considering some of the issues. "(They) are basically attempting to poison the minds of friendly people of Bangladesh against India." The high commissioner said both Bangladesh and India were getting due share of waters as per the Ganges water treaty singed by the previous Awami League government in 1996. "Some people in the country are trying to derive political mileage over the water share of common rivers.

The Indian envoy raises several interrelated points here. He dismisses those academics, researchers, journalists and policy makers who are talking and complaining about India's unfair water policy towards Bangladesh as ignorant, who are 'attempting to poison the friendly people of Bangladesh against India. Such comments are not only untrue, these are also designed to discredit any attempt by Bangladeshi citizens (and also many Indian researchers and analysts) who oppose India's water aggression against Bangladesh, a process starting from 1975. Mr. Chakravarty (upper class Bengali Brahmin) thinks that the Bangladeshi people are still as ignorant as they were in 1947 and that the only 'knowledgeable Bangladeshis' are those who gather around the Indian table for crumbs.

Who are the people opposing the Tipaimukh Dam as well as India's other projects for unilateral withdrawal/diversion of waters from international rivers? Their list includes well known Professors like Muzaffar Ahmed, Emajuddin Ahmed, Moniruzzaman Miah, Mahbubullah, Aynun Nishat, Asif Nazrul, Jasim U Ahmed and Badrul Imam, journalists and columnists like Serajur Rahman, Farhad Mazhar, Mahmudur Rahman, Sadek Khan, Nurul Kabir and Rizwan Siddiqi, former secretaries having negotiating experience with Indian counterparts like Asafoddoulah and Shamsher M Chowdhury as well as prominent water experts like Dr. S. I. Khan and Tauhidul Anwar Khan. They have written numerous articles and participated in dozens of seminars and discussion meetings on the India-Bangladesh water issues and drawn attention to the implications and dangers of India's water policy [2]. Mr. Chakravarty may not like what these people say, but it a serious insult to our national prestige when a second grade foreign diplomat violates all diplomatic norms and practices and has the audacity to call them ignorant, and accusing them of 'trying to poison the minds of common people.'

For the last few months, millions of people across the country including Dhaka, Sylhet, Rajshahi, Khulna and Chittagong, as well as thousands of overseas Bangladeshis are protesting against India's water policy. Protests have been organized in London, New York, Paris, Madrid, Rome and elsewhere by various political and community groups. These people are not inherently anti-Indian but seriously concerned about the disaster that the Tipaimukh Dam and India's other river projects would bring to Bangladesh. They do not belong to one particular political grouping to derive 'political mileage as alleged by the Indian envoy. On the contrary, they have different political opinions (right, centre and left) and all witnessed the effects of the Farakka Barrage and, therefore, they are seriously concerned about the effects of the Tipaimukh Dam.

The protests against the disastrous Farakka Barrage have been going on for years and by now everybody (even most pro-Indian Awami League supporters, except few quislings) know that the Barrage has caused irreparable damage to the river Padma and all of its branches by drying them up, causing silting, increasing salinity, lowering the ground water levels, damaging agriculture, ecology and environment in the whole region south of the Padma. The Bangladeshi 'Friends of India' should have organized the meeting not in a five-star hotel in Dhaka but on the dried up river bed of the Padma so that Mr. Chakravarty could see that the devastation caused by Farakka is not hypothetical but real and the victims have no reason to be 'friendly' with India.

Pinak's deregoratory remarks about the people who oppose India's water aggression against Bangladesh as well as his criticism of the opposition BNP party have been widely condemned [3]. The only people who are conspicuously silent on Pinak's derogatory remarks are the leaders of the current pro-India government. They seem to be too willing to implement the Indian agenda rather than upholding the most vital national interest of the people [4]. Prime minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed and her party leaders always claim that they are the only people to stand firm against all foreign aggressive powers but in reality they have failed miserably to defend the legitimate interests of the Bangladeshi people, especially against the big bully next door.

During the first term of Sheikh Hasina's premiership (1996-2001), the government resisted many of India's demands on Bangladesh (corridor, use of Chittagong port, the Tata proposal, tri-nation gas pipeline, marginalizing the defence forces, etc] but the current government is behaving in an extremely subservient manner. Many ministers in Sheikh Hasina's present government (Dipu Moni, Faruk Khan, Abul Hussain and Ramesh C. Sen among others) have been speaking in a way that raises doubt about their competence and/or allegiance towards a truly sovereign Bangladesh state [4]. They are too eager to implement India's different covert and overt agenda at the expense of vital national interests of the Bangladeshi people.

The Indian envoy made the false and audacious remarks in the presence of foreign minister Dipu Moni and several other Awami League stalwarts. But, unfortunately, none of them contradicted the envoy. This and other incidents do suggest that the current Bangladesh government is most probably run by the Indian officials headed by Pinak R. Chakravarty and guided by New Delhi's South Bloc. How long this situation would be tolerated by the people of Bangladesh remains to be seen.

References and notes:

[1] http://www.thebangladeshtoday.com/leading%20news.htm.

[2] There are hundreds of reports and essays written by prominent authors and published in print and internet media. For a brief and thoughtful analysis of India's Water Aggression against Bangladesh, one may refer to a book by Dr. M. T. Hussain India's Farakka Barrage ' Cold Blooded Murder of Bangladesh, Al Hilal Publishers Ltd, London, 1996 and an essay by Barrister MBI Munshi Water Scarcity and the Threat of Water Wars in South Asia' A Bangladeshh Perspective (http://deshcalling.blogspot.com/June 09, 2009. Many Indian authors have also written investigative reports that highlight the ill-effects of big dams and barrages.

[3] http://nation.ittefaq.com/issues/2009/06/23/news0828.htm.

[4] For a partial record of these ministers' subservience to Indian Embassy in Dhaka, see an article by Serajur Rahman (http://www.dailynayadiganta.com/2009/06/09/default.asp).

[Cardiff, UK, 24 June 2009]


Link

India: Politicization of the Armed Forces

Adm. Arun Prakash (Retd)

The recent displays of blatant praetorianism across our eastern and western borders have served to confirm that the Indian Armed Forces are truly the sole sub-continental inheritors of the priceless apolitical tradition bequeathed by their British progenitors. Armies are sent into battle only when statesmen and diplomats have been unsuccessful in ensuring peace. Our Armed Forces have not only fought gallantly on the battlefield but consistently and impartially upheld India's integrity and secular democratic tradition, when all others have failed the nation.

Their darkest hour occurred in the wake of Operation Blue Star; an unseen internal crisis which threatened to rend the taut fabric of discipline and loyalty which binds together our magnificent Army. The manner in which it contained and defused this calamity will remain another (untold) saga of outstanding military leadership.

This monastic devotion to discipline is the reason that Subhash Bose's Indian National Army and the Free Indian Legion are, till today, spoken of in hushed tones in the Service environment. The exact details of the 1942 Royal Indian Navy mutiny (even though it imparted a decisive impetus to the freedom movement) will forever remain confined to confidential volumes kept under lock and key on board every warship. Similarly, public expressions of defiance like hunger-strikes, dharnas, marches and demonstrations by civilians cause acute discomfort to the soldier, sailor and airman because they run contrary to the essence of all that he has been ever taught: unquestioning respect and obedience of lawful authority.

Once he doffs his uniform, an ex-Serviceman (ESM) is technically liberated from the restraints of military discipline, and is free to adopt the demeanor and behaviour of any civilian on the street. But deep inside, his soul cringes at the very thought of conducting himself in a manner which would have brought disrepute to his uniform, unit or Service.

Why then did our ESM start resorting to demonstrations in April 2008, in the heart of the national capital as well as in many states? Why did they thereafter graduate to relay fasts at Jantar Mantar? And why are they now surrendering their precious medals to low level functionaries in Rashtrapati Bhavan?.

Although they have conducted themselves in a most dignified and orderly manner, the very fact that veterans ranging from Generals to Jawans have been marching on the streets and squatting on footpaths has sent shock waves throughout the Services community; even if the media and our fellow citizens have largely ignored this disturbing development.

I am not about to argue the case of the ESM, but a brief summary of events would help to orient the reader. In early-2006 when the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) loomed into sight, the Service Chiefs, individually and collectively, through the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), appealed to the Raksha Mantri, on the basis of bitter past experience, that a Service member be included in the CPC. This request having been declined, when the CPC Report was released in 2008, the Services found to their dismay that the recommendations expectedly contained many glaring anomalies impacting adversely on serving personnel as well as ESM.

At the persistent urgings of the Service Chiefs, a Review Committee was constituted; ironically yet again bereft of a Service representative. The Review Committee aggravated the anomalous situation by arbitrarily making some further unwarranted modifications. A series of instructions were issued by the Defence Accounts and pension disbursing authorities which were self-contradictory and compounded the prevailing confusion as well as unhappiness. While the Chairman COSC took up the issues relating to serving personnel with the Government, the ESM became convinced that since no one was listening to them, they had no choice but to adopt agitational methods. They have, therefore, taken to the streets since April 2008.

Military veterans, world-wide are objects of spontaneous respect, affection and admiration because they are national symbols of courage, patriotism and sacrifice; a segment deserving of special consideration by the Government. The grievances of our ESM, should, therefore, have been handled with far more sensitivity and responsiveness, than they actually were.

The current ESM movement has been able to mobilize opinion country-wide and gather self-sustaining momentum, mainly due to connectivity provided by the Internet and cellular phone networks. While the MoD seems to have adopted a disdainful and detached stance towards their grievances, the ESM roll-on agenda now encompasses canvassing political support for their cause, and even the formation of an ESM political party which will put up candidates for the forthcoming General Elections.

Thus it is now obvious that, while the nation slept, the process of "politicization" of our Armed Forces is well under way, if not complete. The 6th CPC has also inflicted serious collateral damage by deepening the existing civil-military chasm and thereby further slowing down the languid functioning of the MoD.

As a former Army Chief has pointed out, the ESM retain "an umbilical connection" with the serving personnel; they hail from the same regions or neighbouring villages and often belong to the same extended family, whom they meet when on leave. In any case, the Services and ESM constitute one big family. No one should have any doubts that the essence of whatever happens at Jantar Mantar or India Gate will slowly but surely filter back by a process of "reverse osmosis" to the men in uniform.

Even if the politicians and bureaucrats do not care, the nation's intelligentsia (where are they?) need to introspect. Does the nation want proud, independent and self-respecting Armed Forces who live by the professional soldiers' honour code and die unquestioningly for their country; or do we want their soldiers tainted with the stain of "politics". Were this to happen – even by default – it would constitute the most grievous injury to be needlessly inflicted on itself by the Indian state.

India's democracy requires that the Armed Forces must be restored to their original pristine state at the earliest; detached from politics, and focused on the profession of arms. The first step is to remove the ESM from the streets, and the best means would be to constitute a multi-party Parliamentary Commission (what is termed a Blue Ribbon Commission in the UK), and NOT another committee of bureaucrats, to examine and address the full gamut of issues.

Link

Monday, 22 June 2009

Global Jihad: ICNA’s Evil Twin in Bangladesh

ByJoe Kaufman

Although they are on opposite sides of the globe, thousands of miles from each other, the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) based out of Queens, New York and Bangladesh Islami Chhatri Sangstha (BICS) based in Dhaka, Bangladesh sport an identical logo. Why? Maybe it's because the groups are part of the same organization, sharing the same hateful ideologies, and possessing the same extremist underpinnings. The proof comes from the groups themselves.

In 1941, the Muslim Brotherhood, the fanatic religious/political movement that began in Egypt over a decade earlier, reached the shores of South Asia. Under the name Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), individuals throughout Pakistan and, later, its surrounding areas embraced the organization's belligerent philosophies.

One of these areas was Bangladesh.

Bangladesh Islami Chhatri Sangstha or BICS is a JI female student group, which was established at Dhaka University (DU) in 1978. This location and time period is curious, as just seven years prior, a series of massacres took place in Bangladesh, then-East Pakistan, to which DU was a main target and of which JI was a key offender.

Beginning in February, throughout the majority of 1971, upwards of 3,000,000 Bengalis – mostly unarmed – were systematically slaughtered at the hands of the Pakistani army in collaboration with Islamist groups. Marked for death were Hindus and Muslims said to be tainted by "Un-Islamic influences." Men were set on fire, women were raped, and children were stabbed mercilessly with bayonets. The perpetrators included the military wing of JI, Al-Badr, then-led by Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojahid, who is currently the Secretary General of JI Bangladesh and who was recently summoned to appear before a Dhaka court to face charges of war crimes.

At the end of the war, following Bangladeshi liberation, the diary of another Al-Badr operative, Ashrafuzzaman Khan, was recovered from his residence. It contained a list of names and addresses of several prominent Bengalis targeted as victims in the war, including a number of DU professors. Khan is accused of leading a death squad and personally shooting and murdering at least seven of the DU faculty, whose names were found in his book. During the war, hundreds of DU's students were slain as well.

While the members of BICS might not have been responsible for the murders, the supremacist and exclusionary attitude which gave context to the atrocities is very much the same within the organization. On the BICS website, the following statements are read:
  •  "Its [BICS] aim is to establish in among the female students the superiority of Islam, the ideology suitable for human nature."
  • "Only Islam can develop human beings as wellwishers of humanity and decent in the true sense."
  • "We also believe that there can be no alternative to Islam… It is also our bounden duty to save our sisters from the onslaught of jahiliah, blind imitation of other civilizations…"
Another group, located roughly 8000 miles from BICS, the Islamic Circle of North America or ICNA, exhibits these same bigoted tendencies. The following are statements made on ICNA's Why Islam (WI) site in 2009:
  • "The article [concerning 'gay history lessons'] is an eye [sic] opening for those who keep on sending their children to state schools to be mis-educated and de-educated by the non-Muslim monolingual teachers. Bilingual Muslim children need state funded Muslim schools with bilingual Muslim teachers as role models during their developmental periods. There is no place for a non-Muslim child or a teacher in a Muslim school."
  • "You guys [Jews] have been cursed, and G-d's anger is over you… Who will win? This is really not difficult to figure out… When faced with persecution by the Nazis, did the Jews rise up to fight their oppressors? No, they ran away to Palestine from Europe. The moral of this story is that when the going gets tough, the Jews pack their bags and leave."
  • "First of all, muslims do not believe in the G-d of the corrupted Bible, but we do believe in Allah… Anyone who says 'la ilahe ilallah' (there is not god but Him)… is guaranteed with eternal life in heaven… Abt penalty, there is no penalty to be done for our sins. This is [sic] wat u christians made up!!"
ICNA was created as JI's American affiliate in 1971, the same year as the Bangladesh massacres. Indeed, accused Al-Badr death squad leader, Ashrafuzzaman Khan, whose Al-Hera Islamic Institute is located less than two miles from ICNA in the Jamaica section of Queens, is a former National Vice President and Secretary General of ICNA.

ICNA's current Secretary General, Muhammad Naeem Baig, contends that ICNA is free from any foreign ties. He stated, in July of 2007 at ICNA's 32nd Annual Convention, "Islamic Circle of North America is a U.S. based Islamic organization. We have no relations – no links – to any organization or any country outside the United States." It was, of course, a lie, as has been proven by this author on a number of occasions.

And a brand new proof has been discovered to end all debate on the matter.

When looking at the websites of ICNA and BICS, a striking similarity is immediately noticed – both organizations use the same exact logo, a flower head-shaped icon with the word "Allah" inscribed inside of it in Arabic. The logo has been found on the homepage of ICNA's National website since at least 1998, and it is all over the website and materials of BICS.

In reality, the Islamic Circle of North America is a South Asian extremist group operating from American shores. While ICNA and BICS are located in different parts of the world, they are part of the same sinister organization, propagating the same hate, striving to wreak the same havoc and cause the same harm to humanity.

Link

Monday, 15 June 2009

India: Sukhois deployed over eastern skyline

http://www.sakaaltimes.com/ImageRetrevial.aspx?Id=b3a6f21c-8b12-4eb9-a19c-f76c29a53617100&wid=100&hei=

TEZPUR: The Indian Air Force (IAF) today formally deployed a squadron of Sukhois to guard the country's eastern skyline, although the ceremony was kept low-key.

An IAF official informed that the induction ceremony was carried out from the Tezpur air base of the IAF, but it was made low key and kept away from the media glare as a mark of respect for the AN 32 crash victims.

Nevertheless, it was an emotional moment for the Tezpur air base which had begun with only vintage Vampires and Toofanis.

The IAF officers and ranks broke in applause as the Squadron rolled into the air base, marking a new beginning for the air defence in the eastern skies.

The Sukhois will be India's main attack wing and can reach the Chinese frontier in less than four minutes after taking off from any of the three airports of Assam to be used by the Sukhois. The first Squadron has four aircraft.

Later, another squadron will be inducted in Chabua of Upper Assam. Both the stations are just four-six minutes away from the Chinese border. The Sukhois can reach a maximum speed of 1.5 Mach and the Chinese frontier is hardly 100 kilometers away.

''It can reach the border of Indian skies in any direction, be it China or Myanmar, in minutes from these two bases,'' the IAF official informed.

The basing of Sukhoi aircraft at Tezpur is in keeping with a policy in which the Indian military is being strengthened near its borders with China. It began in Ladakh, where the Western Air Command revived two airfields - Daulat Beg Oldi and Chushul - and has continued in the Northeast.

Already the IAF base at Tezpur has been strengthened and in fact the last MiG 21 squadron was removed from here last year, preparing for the arrival of Sukhois.

''The work having been completed, the airfield is going to open shortly for both civil and military operations. Stated to house the lethal Sukhoi-30, the station is gearing up to receive the aircraft in the second week of June,'' the IAF source said.

The SU-30 is a twin cockpit, multi-role all-weather, superiority fighter with air-to-air refuelling capability. The aircraft, now being manufactured at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (Nasik), was originally designed and developed in Russia.

Air Force Station Tezpur is presently commanded by Air Commodore T K Nair, a fighter pilot of repute, who has over 33 years of experience in a variety of Command and Staff appointments. An IAF source said modernisation projects had been taken up in five airfields in the eastern and north-eastern regions - Tezpur, Chhabua and Jorhat in Assam, Purnea in Bihar and Panagarh in Bengal.

Runways were being extended from 9,000 to 11,000 feet.

A squadron in the IAF usually has around four aircraft. An Air Force source said there were currently five squadrons of Sukhoi-30 Mki aircraft, one of which was yet to be fully raised. In five years, the Air Force is expected to have more than 200 Sukhoi 320 Mki in its fleet.

Tezpur was the home of MiG operational flying training unit that shut down. The units were moved to Bagdogra in North Bengal and Chabua. With the MiG 21s - currently the mainstay of the IAF's fighting fleet - due to be phased out in another two to three years, the training units will be shut down.

''The four aircraft will formalise the Sukhoi flying routes.

After that plans are afoot to station the Sukhois at Chabua air station in the Northeast (Assam) and at Halwara (Punjab) and Jodhpur (Rajasthan) in the west,'' the official added, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The Airfield in Tezpur was constructed by the British Royal Indian Air Force during the Second World War in 1942. It was subsequently developed into a full fledged Air Force base in 1959.

Its location bears great significance since it lies strategically between Bhutan, Tibet, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Ever since its inception it has been one of the most active bases in the NE with a variety of fixed and rotary wing aircraft operating from here.

The first aircraft that flew at this base were Vampires and Toofani. 101 reconnaissance squadron with Vampire aircraft and four squadrons with Toofanis were the first to be located at this base.

Subsequently came 29 Sqn (Toofani), 37 Sqn (Hunter), 4 Sqn (MiG-21), 8 Sqn (MiG-21), 28 Sqn (MiG-21), 110 HU (Mi-4 Helicopters), 30 Sqn (MiG-21), MOFTU (MiG Operational Flying Training Unit) with MiG-21s and 115 HU (Cheetah/Chetak helicopters).

In fact, in the last 25 years it was home to the MiG-21 fleet which was used extensively to train rookie pilots for the Indian Air Force most of whom fondly remember their days spent in Tezpur.

The aircraft continues to give yeoman service to the Air Force operating from other bases in the North East. The Airfield also handled civil flights from 1993, being the only feeder to the state of Arunachal Pradesh.

In September 2007, fighter operations were discontinued at the base to facilitate extensive runway repairs and extension.

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Friday, 5 June 2009

Bangladesh Appoints new Army Chief

http://www.bdnews24.com/nimage/2009-06-04-16-51-41-mobin.JPG
Lieutenant General Muhammad Abdul Mubin

Dhaka, June 4 (bdnews24.com)—The government has named Lieutenant General Muhammad Abdul Mubin as new army chief.

Gen Mubin, former GOC in Jessore and Chittagong, was made , Principal Staff Officer to the Armed Forces Division exactly a year ago, on June 4, 2008, in a major reshuffle of top army posts.

He will replace General Moeen U Ahmed, whose extended term ends on June 13.

Mubin made a well-received televised statement on the night of Feb 27 to clarify that the 'general amnesty' the government had declared during the Feb 25-26 BDR mutiny did not mean that rebel BDR border guards involved in killings, arson and other crimes would go unpunished.

Moeen U Ahmed is widely regarded as having had a key role in the '1/11 takeover' and formation of the new caretaker government after the state of emergency was imposed on the day in 2007.

The unprecedented two-year caretaker administration came to be called the 'army-installed' government, while Moeen's speeches on national and political matters raised question as to his intentions.

He was repeatedly forced to deny any possibility of an army takeover during the two turbulent years.

On April 6 last year, the Moeen's term was extended by another year. The extension took effect from June 15 that year and ends on June 13.

Mubin, meanwhile, served as the coordinator of the national coordination committee against corruption during the caretaker government's anticorruption drive against political bigwigs and businessmen.

A close associate told bdnews24.com on Thursday that Gen Mubin's family and friends were calling and visiting to congratulate him on his new assignment.

Link

Thursday, 4 June 2009

Global Jihad: Hizbut Towhid Bangladesh goes international

Hizbut Towhid (HuT), which was established in Bangladesh's Tangail district under the leadership of Mr. Bayeejid Khan Ponni @ Selim Ponni has secretly established its branch in a number of countries in recent years with the aim of establishing branches of this ultra religious terrorist group in those countries.

The international Head Quarters of Hizbut Towhid although is located in Dhaka (Bangladesh), the group has established a huge office at Malaysia's Kuala Lumpur, where a Bangladeshi terrorist named Tanzil Chowdhury is given the responsibility of liaising with other terror groups like Al Qaida from Kuala Lumpur and collect fund for this organization from international donors.

Hizbut Towhid purchased a luxurious apartment in the name of Tanzil Chowdhury at Apartment no. A-8-5, 1 Desa Residence, Taman Desa, Kuala Lumpur 58100, Malaysia.

Hizbut Towhid purchased this apartment in the name of Tanzil Chowdhury, two years back at the cost of US$ 3 hundred thousand. They also purchased a Mercedes Benz and a Hammar Jeep for the Malaysia office of HuT.

Tanzil Chowdhury was a pimp of Tareq Rahman, Gias Uddin Al Mamun and many others in Hawa Bhaban. Mamun established a car sales center at Dhaka's Kala Bagan area named 'Trenz', where Tanzil was given the responsibility as the manager. During this time, Tanzil Chowdhury came into contact with Hizbut Towhid.

Moreover, Hawa Bhaban men established a 'Comfort House' at Dhaka's Uttara area which was operated by Tanzil Chowdhury and his wife named Sigma. Gias Uddin Al Mamun, Tareq Rahman, Opu Siraj, Harris Chowdhury and many other Hawa Bhaban men were regularly visiting this house spending hours with hired women or Tanzil's wife Sigma. This 'Comfort House' at Uttara became one of the secret but most effective 'Tadbir' center during BNP rule.

When caretaker government came in power, Tanzil fled the country along with his wife. Meantime, using his previous contact with Hizbut Towhid, Tanzil managed to get their support in opening a huge branch of this group in Kuala Lumpur. Through this branch, every year, a couple of millions of dollars is collected for Hizbut Towhid.

Tanzil also is doing manpower and 'Hawala' (money laundering) business in Kuala Lumpur. Most of the fleeing BNP or Hawa Bhaban men are seen at the above mentioned apartment at Taman Desa during late hours. It is even learnt that, Al Qaida's threat fax to American Embassy and other embassies in Bangladesh was originated from this house of Tanzil Chowdhury.

Tanzil Chowdhury is also involved in various types of criminal activities. In Bangladesh Tanzil was continuing fraudulent activities with the help of his wife as well he was maintaining close relations with local terrorist groups. He was a close friend of 'Pichchi Hannan'.

Link

Monday, 1 June 2009

Bangladesh: Odhikar Human Rights Report - 01-31MAY 09

01 June, 2009

HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING REPORT ON BANGLADESH

1-31 MAY, 2009

 

EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING CONTINUES: ONE KILLED EVERY TWO DAYS

 

CONCERN OVER ARRESTS AND IMPEDIMENTS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY

'UNNATURAL DEATHS' OF MIGRANT WORKERS

 

PROTEST AGAINST TORTURE ON BDR MEMBERS

 

MASS ARREST EVEN AFTER GENERAL AMNESTY

 

QUESTION REGARDING THE LIST OF FUGITIVE BDR JAWANS

 
  1. Odhikar is committed to uphold the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the people and as part of its commitment, monitors the human rights situation in Bangladesh. Odhikar presents below a human rights monitoring report covering 1 to 31 May, 2009.

EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING CONTINUES DESPITE GOVERNMENT ASSURANCE

  1. Until 31 May 2009, a total of 29 people have reportedly been extra-judicially killed after the Awami League-led alliance assumed office on 6 January 2009. Among them, 15 people were killed in May 2009 alone. During the Universal Periodic Review of Bangladesh, at the 3 February 2009 Human Rights Council in Geneva, the Foreign Minister Dr. Dipu Moni assured all present that the government would show 'zero tolerance' towards extrajudicial killings, torture and custodial deaths.
  2. On 5 May 2009, LGRD and Cooperative Minister Syed Ashraful Islam said "the government will not allow the law enforcing agencies to use 'crossfire' as a tool. The establishment of rule of law is a must for a democratic country and for this; no extrajudicial killing will be allowed.1." The day after this statement, the State Minister for Home Affairs, Tanzim Ahmed Sohel Taj said, "the Awami League government will not allow any kind of extrajudicial killing, but the law enforcers have the right to self-defence as per the Constitution. They can do whatever is needed in accordance with law for self-defence against armed criminals2."
  3. Meanwhile on 16 May 2009, the Home Minister Sahara Khatun said, "the law enforcers should have the right to save themselves when they come under attack. Incidents of encounter occur only when members of the law enforcing agencies come under attack from criminals3." Contradictory statements by such Ministers holding the highest profiles, demonstrates the ambivalence of the present government with regard to extrajudicial killing. As a result, extrajudicial killings continue. Odhikar expresses deep concern over the contradictory statements and the continuous practice of extrajudicial killing by the law enforcement agencies.
  4. Among other reasons, such as eliminating political opponents of the government, extrajudicial killings have been taking place due to the failure of the criminal justice system. To address the gap, Odhikar believes international opinion should be raised to convince the government of Bangladesh of the seriousness of the matter. Bangladesh has been elected a member of the UN Human Rights Council for the second time on 12 May 2009. Several incidents of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, took place after the UNHRC election in 2006, which was a violation of the electoral undertakings of the Human Rights Council. Odhikar appeals to the present government to take immediate measures to implement the UNHRC electoral undertakings and stop human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings and torture.
  5. In May 2009, 15 persons were reportedly killed by law enforcement agencies. Among them, 10 were killed by RAB, 1 by police, 1 by RAB-police jointly, 2 were killed by Army and 1 by Ansar4. Among those 15 killed, 3 died in custody. 

Circumstances of death

  1. It was reported that of the 15 persons killed, 14 were killed in crossfire/ encounter/ gunfight/ shootout5. Among them, 10 were killed in crossfire/ encounter/ gunfight/ shootout6 by RAB, 1 by police and 1 by RAB-police jointly and 2 were killed by Army. Furthermore, 1 was reportedly killed by Ansar.

Identity of Victims

  1. Among those killed, 2 were students, 1 was from Purbo Banglar Communist Party (Jonojuddho), 2 were from UPDF, 1 was from Jubo League, 1 a youth, 1 an alleged mugger, 1 belonged to an alleged gangster group 'Gangchil Bahini' and 6 were alleged criminals.

CONCERN OVER ARRESTS AND IMPEDIMENTS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY

  1. Police arrested seven members of the Hizb-ut Tahrir Organisation on 9 May 2009 during a political programme. The arrested persons were Abdur Rakib, Shahadat Hossain, Fakhrul Hassan, Abdulla-Al-Mamun, Noman Sikdar, Arifuzzaman and Mir Salehin. The Officer-in-Charge of Badda Police Station, Wazed Ali informed Odhikar that they were arrested under section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure7 on suspicion of militant activities. The government alleged that some anti-government leaflets were recovered from them, which contained 'provocative statements' blaming the government for the BDR mutiny at Pilkhana. Every citizen has the right to freedom of association, assembly and speech as guaranteed in Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Such political repression limits the space for democracy and provokes resentment.
  2. Odhikar expresses deep concern regarding such arrest and urges the government to refrain from impeding in and shrinking democratic space. The government must also refrain from suppressing political activists because they believe in a different ideology.

'UNNATURAL DEATHS' OF MIGRANT WORKERS

  1. Bangladeshi workers have been dying while working in different countries across the world. In the last four months, a total of 904 deceased migrant workers8 were returned home from different countries. Of them, 32 were women workers. The deceased workers' families alleged that most of the workers died due to illness resulting from torture, though the death certificates showed them as having had 'heart attacks'. Workers of this country go abroad through brokers and recruiting agencies many of which do not have proper licenses. Given this fact, a large number of workers fall victim to cheating by the recruiting agencies, and cannot seek legal redress for fear of being victimised by the police.
  2. Odhikar believes that the remittance sent by migrant workers is one of the prime sources of national income, and plays a significant role in enhancing the economy and GDP of the country as well as family stability. Unfortunately, their labour and working conditions were hardly ever appreciated during any regime. 
  3. Odhikar urges the government to form a special cell immediately in Bangladeshi missions abroad where there is a Bangladeshi labour market. This should be monitored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Odhikar believes that it is the moral responsibility of the government to monitor recruiting agencies, taking action against unscrupulous and unlicensed recruiting agencies and to arrange compensation for victims of torture and the families of deceased migrant workers.

PROTEST AGAINST TORTURE ON BDR MEMBERS

  1. Almost everyday detained BDR jawans9 are being weeded out through investigation under suspicions of involvement in the mutiny at Pilkhana. After scrutiny, they are being sent to different barracks before arrest. They are then handed over to the police station where they agree to give statements after interrogation. It was alleged that the BDR jawans fall victim to torture while giving confessional statements. In court, BDR members Zafur Ali, Masud, Sohrab, Yusuf Ali and Nayek Sheikh Monirul Islam alleged that they were tortured in custody.
  2. Odhikar would like to recall that the obtaining of a confession through torture is a grave violation of human rights and as a rule, such confessional statements should not be accepted by the court.  Bangladesh ratified the Convention against Torture on 5 October 1998. Odhikar expresses its deep concern about the allegations of torture and death of detained BDR members in custody.  Odhikar urges the government to respect treaty obligations and ensure that the BDR jawans are not tortured in custody.

MASS ARREST EVEN AFTER GENERAL AMNESTY

  1. A total of 1720 BDR members from outside Dhaka have reportedly been arrested so far under sedition cases. The family members of the arrested BDR jawans alleged that the government has broken its promise to not carry out mass arrests and despite a general amnesty declared by the Prime Minister.
  2. Odhikar demands transparency and accountability, in particular, during arrest and investigation. Odhikar also believes that through the mass arrest of BDR jawans across the country, the government has contravened its commitment after general amnesty. Odhikar recalls again that the government should protect human rights of BDR jawans and try them in civilian court under the existing laws.

QUESTIONS REGARDING THE LIST OF FUGITIVE BDR JAWANS

  1. The government published a list of 25 fugitive BDR members with their photographs on 20 May 2009, who were directly involved in the mutiny and killing at the BDR headquarters.  It was learnt that two of them, Abdus Samad and Ayub Ali, are presently in jail, and therefore, cannot be labeled as fugitive.
  2. Odhikar believes that the government suffers from serious lack of transparency and accountability in almost all aspects, including the manner of carrying out the investigation of the BDR mutiny. Odhikar demands the government publish yet again the list after expunging the names of those two BDR jawans from the fugitive list and create an opportunity that allows their families to meet them in jail.

OTHER FORMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Illegal Fatwa

  1. Some village people, including a so-called 'religious' man Abul Kashem and one Ruhul Amin ordered that unmarried mother, Rahima Akhtar be punished by whipping in a salish10 in the name of fatwa. This incident took place at Noagaon village in Daudkandi Upazial of Comilla district on 22 May 2009. Rahima Akhtar suffered serious wounds due to her punishment. 
  2. Rahima has been demanding that Abdul Karim of the same village acknowledge her six-year-old son Ramjan as his son too. Rahima had to suffer unreasonable punishment by the influential villagers, while Karim denied that Ramjan was his son. After the incident, police arrested Abul Kashem, Abdul Karim and one Shah Alam. Rahima has been admitted to the Dhaka Medical College Hospital. However, the Prime Minister has ordered the concerned authority to ascertain the identity of Ramjan's father through a DNA examination.     

Rape

  1. Between 1 and 31 May 2009, a total of 33 women and girls reportedly fell victim to rape. Among them, 16 were women and 17 were children, aged below sixteen. Out of the 16 women, 3 were reportedly killed after rape, 5 were victims of gang rape while out of the 17 girls 2 were reportedly killed after rape and 5 were victims of gang rape.

Dowry Related Violence

  1. The most common reason for domestic violence occurs due to dowry11 demands. In May 2009, a total of 19 women reportedly became victims of dowry demands. Among them, 16 women were reportedly killed by their husbands and in-laws and 2 were tortured. Besides, one woman committed suicide due to unbearable torture during this period.

Acid Violence

  1. During the period 1-31 May, 2009 reports show that a total of 11 persons became victims to acid violence. Of them, 5 were women, 3 men and 3 children (2 girls and 1 boy).

India-Bangladesh border violence

  1. In May 2009, the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) reportedly killed 10 Bangladeshis, 7 were injured and 3 Bangladeshi nationals were allegedly abducted and 8 were missing. Besides, 11 Bangla speaking people were allegedly pushed-in by the BSF during this time.
  2. Human rights violations continued at the border areas, perpetrated by the BSF, which violates international laws.
  3. Odhikar demands that the government take effective action to stop the killing of Bangladeshi people by the Indian BSF and also urges the government to demand compensation for the victims and/or their families.

Death in Jail

  1. During this reporting period 5 persons reportedly died in jail allegedly due to illness.

Freedom of the Press

  1. Between 1 and 31 May 2009, several journalists were harassed and intimidated in various ways. It is reported that 9 journalists were injured and 23 were threatened. 

Political Violence Continues

  1. During this reporting period, a total of 27 people were reported killed and 1210 people were injured due to political violence.
  2. A total of 41 incidents were recorded, perpetrated mainly by activists and supporters of the Awami League (AL) and its front organisations while BNP12 was involved in 2 incidents.  One person was allegedly killed and 448 injured during intra party clashes in the Awami League.

Condition of Ready-Made Garment Workers

  1. In the last month, worker's unrest was observed in many ready-made garment factories. Most of the incidents took place due to demands of proper wages and dues.
  2. Odhikar urges the government to cancel the license of those factories that are not following the tripartite agreement and thereby have contributed in continuing the workers unrest.
Statistics of Human Rights violations
01 -31 May 2009
Name of the violation Number of violence
Extrajudicial killing 15
BSF Killing 10
Rape 33
Acid violence 11
Dowry  violence 19


 

Recommendations

    1. As per government declaration, extrajudicial killings must be stopped as the present government has promised 'zero tolerance' this practice at both national and international forums. The Government should prosecute the perpetrators in accordance with the law.
    2. The government should refrain from impeding in and shrinking the space of democratic exercise, and also abstain from suppressing political activists who believe in a different ideology.
    3. The government needs to strictly implement the existing overseas employment policy to ensure protection for migrant workers both overseas and those that return.
    4. Torture on BDR members in custody during interrogation must be stopped.
    5. The general amnesty for BDR members, declared by the Prime Minister should be implemented.
    6. The Government has to ensure transparency and accountability in regard to publishing an accurate list of detained/arrested and fugitive BDR members.
 
 
 
 Email to BDOsint from Odhikar

Friday, 29 May 2009

Commentary:Bangladesh and Pakistan - Flirting with Failure in South Asia

BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN, Flirting with Failure in South Asia - by William B Milam


 Shamsher M. Chowdhury, Bir Bikram


Ambassador William B. Milam, or Bill Milam as he is popularly called, takes us on a journey in his book through the political evolution in Bangladesh and Pakistan in the period following their break up as one country and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971. Having served as the Ambassador of the United States to both these countries, it would be fair to assume that Ambassador Milam would have had a ringside view to follow developments closely enough to reach the conclusions that he has in his book.

In the words of the author, the book is interspersed with several motifs. Religion is one, and understandably so since it was religion that was the basis for partitioning India after the British Raj ended in 1947. As a corollary to that, culture has been cited as the second motif and history is the third. A recurring motif is the relations of both of these countries with their giant neighbor India. A common element is the role of the military in the political developments in both of the countries.

I will understandably confine my comments to the Bangladesh segments only.

In the case of Bangladesh, Milam believed that with the reintroduction of democratic political civilian led government in early nineteen nineties, the military had retreated to the barracks for good. He was less sure about that in the case of Pakistan. This was the main conclusion when the book was ready for print in early 2007. But events in Bangladesh in January 2007 forced him to change all that and the book needed rewording before it was finally published in 2009.

In the 'Introduction' chapter, Milam blames the "poisonous, zero-sum, political culture of the major political forces in Bangladesh that created the opportunity for a return of the military in January 2007, albeit, this time behind a civilian façade. In chapter 6 he details how this zero-sum game was played out in the fifteen plus years of civil political rule since 1991, resulting in a violent and confrontational political culture where the only real losers were the very voters who had entrusted these very politicians with their fate.

In writing for the Pakistani English daily "Daily Times" on January 24th, 2007, Ambassador Milam wondered whether the intervention in Bangladesh on 11th January 2007, would lead the country back from the brink or plunge it in the drink.

As we now see with hindsight, the solution, especially the introduction of a state of emergency and its gross misuse, only served to destroy the very political fabric of the country. Most commentators give the interim government at best a mixed scorecard. All agree it was powerless. The infamous, and abortive, "minus two' formula and the highly politicized anti-corruption drive were its two most stark failures, not to mention the gross use of physical and mental torture on people under custody in violation of international conventions to which Bangladesh is signatory. They even made "Reform" sound like a dirty word, almost synonymous with collaborating with the enemy. In an attempt to "cleanse" the society of corrupt government and political officials, this government launched the much touted 'Truth and Accountability Commission' (Referred to in the book). As events subsequently prove, this was not just a cruel joke; it was a corrupt concept that ran counter to the very fundamental of the country's Constitution that all citizens are equal in the eyes of the law. Worse, it was an exercise in deception.

In the epilogue, Ambassador Milam characterizes the publishing of a voter list with photos and the issuances of a National Identity Card (NID) as a remarkable achievement of the interim government. On Election Day in December 2008, there appeared, inexplicably, a second voter's list, without photos whose authenticity is yet to be measured. As regards the NID, fake and counterfeit ones are now increasingly available in the market!
I thought it prudent here to briefly analyze the period of emergency to put things in perspective.

Milam talks at length, and presents his assessments, of personalities whose very names define the political landscape of Bangladesh even long after their violent departure from the scene—Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur Rahman. Chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to that, although Pakistan's Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is mentioned in details in chapter 2, but only in the context of Pakistan.

In the opening narration of chapter 2, Milam describes Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto as "flawed leaders" with limited intellect or ability to "…anticipate possible future events"……. and they failed to "build upon promising democratic beginnings". He says that they both assumed leadership in a "burst of expectation and optimism but were unable to cash in on the strong mandate they had to nurture and establish viable democracies." He calls both of them "historical failures because there own flaws were important contributing factors to the demise of democracy on their watch" in their respective countries.

Talking about the beginning of Bangladesh' journey as an Independent State following its victory in 1971, Milam mentions the inherent positives the country possessed: a surfeit of good feeling and enthusiasm and a sense of euphoria that helped the early developments like writing a Constitution in a "remarkably short time frame". Despite the negatives like abject poverty and illiteracy, not to mention the wanton damage caused by the occupying Pakistani Army during the period of the Liberation War, Bangladesh, in the words of Milam, "was relatively fertile soil for democracy" that bestowed on Bangladesh a more advantageous beginning than many newly independent, developing countries. But then he talks of the "surfeit of corruption, venality, self-aggrandizement……" that quickly engulfed the country, exacerbated by the new government's mismanagement of the economic recovery and "overt favoritism towards its own partisans". A rather prophetic comment is made by the author in the concluding paragraph on page 30 when he says "The civilian regime took office with overwhelming support, but its hold on the loyalties of most Bangladeshis was dissipated after three years to a point that undemocratic alternatives became attractive as early as 1975."

Ambassador Milam characterizes Sheikh Mujib's period of governance as one from 'Euphoria to Neuralgia'. Mujib is described as the undisputed leader of a new Bangladesh, who was faced with the daunting task of rebuilding a country shattered by the civil war, with a dysfunctional economy and crippled transportation system, severe law and order problems and a population displaced far and wide. As mentioned earlier, the author credits, and rightly so, the government of the day with framing a liberal, democratic Constitution with an independent judiciary for the new country within a short time. But, as mentioned in the book, with increasing political and economic pressure, adherence to liberal constitutionalism and judicial independence broke down by the end of 1974.

In page 34, the author writes about Mujib sinking into "a bog of corruption and ineptitude". He describes Mujib as a good example of charismatic leaders of independent movements who do not always possess the organizational skills or intellectual flexibility to lead successfully the country their charisma had brought about. The subsequent paragraphs goes into details how this charismatic leader seemed to be "woefully short" of the essential mental agility needed to mold the new country into a viable nation. Milam is particularly critical of the socialistic economic policy pursued by the Awami League government under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Large scale nationalization of both the manufacturing sector, specially the jute industry, and the service sector, banks and insurance was severely damaging.

The author calls the Parliamentary elections of March 1973 as the "beginning of the end" for Mujib. Till then Sheikh Mujib and his party still enjoyed relative popularity but the accumulating problems had reduced its appeal. Hence the Awami League leaders "couldn't resist padding the result by blatantly and unnecessarily rigging the polls". In the words of the author, this exacerbated what had already become 'widespread and growing popular discontent with Mujib and the League'. Things indeed got worse by the reign of terror launched by the much despised Jatiya Rakhi Bahini.

In the following paragraphs Milam writes how this sense of discontentment continued to grow into widening dissulionment. With the introduction of the one party governance system (BAKSAL) by amending the Constitution to a Presidential one and thereby giving Sheikh Mujib more personal power, "as if lack of power were at the root of his problems, rather than bad policies combined with overt corruption and incompetence" (page 37)………"Bangladesh had been transformed from a democracy into a personal dictatorship by the man who led its independence movement" (page 38).

Milam completes his narrative on this charismatic leader by briefly describing the events of his violent and brutal death, and that of most of his family members, in the early morning of 15th August, 1975. He says "popular esteem for Mujib had fallen so low by then that few lamented this brutal act, but its legacy continues to haunt Bangladeshi politics."

Chapter 3 of the book is exclusively about Ziaur Rahman and his governance from 1975 to his "untimely" death in 1981; he calls this period "A short lived but fecund era" and he calls Zia's politics as one of "hope and transition". The word fecund has been used here to mean 'very productive, or creative intellectually'.

Talking of how Ziaur Rahman was thrust into the leadership in Bangladesh following the chaotic period caused by military attempts to govern following Sheikh Mujib's assassination in 1975, Milam states one of Zia's early acts after he became Chief Martial Law Administrator was to rescind Mujib's one party system. As Zia slowly but surely consolidated his power and "enhanced his already widespread popularity", he set about traveling all over the country mingling with the common people in a "new and unprecedented form of politicking" spreading "offer of hope for a better future".

Like other military rulers in South Asia, and elsewhere, before and after him, Zia "developed political ambitions and much of Bangladesh supported those aspirations as the first ray of optimism in their hard-scrabble lives'. Milam describes Ziaur Rahman becoming President in April 1977 as "a reflection of his immense popularity with the public".

Milam talks at some length on 'Zia's fledging democracy' and says President Zia's economic and social programmes 'laid the basis of a far-reaching social revolution' which continued to build momentum, and no government, no matter how autocratic, "could have halted this revolution…." The economy was progressing and social development was approaching "take off".

In page 61, Bill Milam talks of Zia's killing and says the "hope for democracy dies with him". However, Milam is critical of Zia's inability as President to strengthen institutions that underpin a democratic system and he set in motion some trends that undermine it like "acquiescence to corruption as a way to buy off potential enemies"…and he had not "set up a mechanism for the automatic and peaceful transfer of power".

In the closing parts of his narratives on this 'extraordinarily popular' man, Ambassador Milam tries to fathom the 'Enigma of Ziaur Rahman'. On the one hand he was a military leader, a national hero, (he was the first to announce the formation of provisional government of Bangladesh from a radio station in Chittagong in March, 1971, page 35), and yet one "who returned his country to civilian rule and to civilian dominated two party electoral democracy" and "whether that was by design or default shall never be known". One thing seemed clear to the author that Zia was "a pragmatic nationalist" and that was his main —- maybe his only —– principle. He used democratic processes to wield political power but doubts he believed in them. He used corruption to ensure loyalty but was incorruptible himself. He also discarded some of the important principles for which he had fought a bloody war of separation from Pakistan, to which Zia's response was a typical combination of pragmatism and political vision —– a desire "to unite and integrate the entire population of Bangladesh into a national identity" (page 67). The iconic Nelson Mandela once said—it's not always about principles, its how you use your position to face the bigger national challenge (my quote, as paraphrased).

Milam describes Zia's political legacy as a mixed one. Among his most positive bequests to the nation was the reintroduction of the multiparty political system that had "withered under Mujib …. And Zia restored stability to Bangladesh when it appeared to be on the path towards catastrophic and chaotic failure". "More than stability, he seems to have brought hope back to a beleaguered population, as disillusioned as he was by the near anarchy that obtained in the final months of Mujib's democratic experiment". But his political legacy involved an authoritarian system of almost personal rule. While this might be justified because of "his success in bringing the country back from the brink", it was liable to misuse by less scrupulous politicians. Milam describes Zia as also being honest and trustworthy. He adds "Zia laid the basis for durable and robust democracy that must develop if Bangladesh is to continue its progress as a leader in social development among both the Third World and the Muslim world".

A telling tribute to Ziaur Rahman comes in page 69 of the book: "It's hard to imagine what would have happened to Bangladesh had Ziaur Rahman been assassinated in 1975 instead of 1981. A failed state on the model of Afghanistan or Liberia might well have resulted. Zia saved Bangladesh from that fate".

Chapter 6 lists the destructive and destabilizing nature of confrontational politics practiced by the two major political parties when they alternated in government and in opposition between 1991 and 2006. Governance worsened with each successive government and corruption and sycophancy gripped almost every organ of the state. They both failed to live up to the people's expectations.

But Bangladesh had a democracy to talk about and it was in transition. Besides, the social and economic indices were much better than countries in similar positions. There was very tangible success in the area of Primary and Secondary education and gender parity was achieved at the secondary level. Employment opportunities for women had overtaken even some developed countries.

In the context of Bangladeshi political leaders, Bill Milam in his book has implied that power, or more power, does not always help one to succeed in governing: people give you that power anyway when they repose their trust and faith in you. It's how you reward that trust with conviction and through your efforts to reach out to them, to touch them and respond to their ethos that makes the difference between success and failure.

Politicians and political leaders, present and of the future, of all hue and political observers would be well advised to read, and more importantly study, Ambassador Bill Milam's book. It's instructive and yet not prescriptive. Importantly, it is candid.

The author of this piece is a decorated freedom fighter and former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador/High Commissioner of Bangladesh to Sri Lanka, Germany, Vietnam and the United States.


Link

Wednesday, 27 May 2009

India: The Hour Of The Untamed Cosmopolitan

Bred on radical diversity and an epic culture, the voter makes a reckoning of Narendra Modi, Prakash Karat, Mayawati and the politics of excess

ASHIS NANDY, Social Scientist

AFTER ALMOST two decades, in many ways, the election of 2009 was a normal election. No overriding consideration drove the voting across the country. Diverse configurations in diverse places determined the fate of different candidates and parties. Different regions had different logic even within a given state. Still, underlying the diversity there were some common themes.

First, I think people were looking for ways to lower the temperature of politics. High-pitched politics has reigned in our polity for nearly 15 years now. My suspicion is people were a bit tired of this. For example, the past two elections showed that in Uttar Pradesh, only one percent of the electorate was interested in Ram Janmabhoomi. The BJP probably played down the issue this year because their internal assessment showed the same thing. Except in West Bengal, nowhere did the election involve an emotional arousal of the kind we have come to routinely expect.

There are reasons for this. In our society, we live with radical diversities — diversity that is not based on tamed forms of difference. The US is a perfect example of tamed diversity. You get every kind of food and dress and cultural activity in America. You think you are very cosmopolitan if you can distinguish Huaiyang food from Schezwan food, or South Korean ballet from Beijing opera, or Ming dynasty china from Han dynasty china in a museum. This is diversity that is permissible, legitimate, tamed.

Radical diversity is when you tolerate and live with people who challenge some of the very basic axioms of your political life. Like most of South Asia, Indians have an old capacity to live with such diversity. A powerful example is Sajjad Lone contesting the election this year. Nobody objected that a secessionist wants to take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution. Everyone spoke of it glowingly. I consider that a tolerance for radical diversity. In such a society, all excesses are ultimately checkmated.

In India, we live in a country where the gods are imperfect and the demons are never fully demonic. I call this an 'epic culture' because an epic is not complete without either the gods or the demons. They make the story together. This is a part of our consciousness, and ultimately, I think it influences our public life. People go up to a point with their grievance, then get tired of it. They realise that to go further is a dangerous thing because it destroys the basic algorithm of your life. They say, enough is enough, let us go back to a normal life. This election represents something of that consciousness. We probably need this kind of interregnum in politics. They have a soothing effect on our public life. This is what most Indians feel.

The second underlying theme is that people were searching for a sort of minimum decency. Negative campaigns, excessively personal attacks, hostile slogans — all of this seemed to upset the voter. When the BJP and the Left targeted Manmohan Singh, making him the butt of jokes and accusations, Singh became a hero for the very qualities people joked about. His weakness, his absence of a political base, his susceptibility to pressures of the Congress high command — instead of looking like liabilities, these things suddenly began to look like a marker of a genteel type of politics. I think that paid dividends. Contrasted with their shrill opponents, Sonia and Rahul Gandhi's conduct too paid dividends.

(I asked a waiter at the India International Centre in Delhi what he felt about the election results. "It's been very good," he said. Was he a Congress supporter, I asked him. "It's not that, sahib," he replied. "That Sardarji is a good man. He is educated, he is not a thief, and he is a newcomer to politics. Still, they got after him, calling him weak and scared. Who can enjoy watching that? I am just happy that this election result has shown there is a god watching above." I quote the waiter verbatim because I think the idea of "a god above" might have been a consideration with many other people as well.)

THE THIRD and interlinked theme this election was the voter's desire to bring down the arrogant. The way Mayawati has lost, in what was once thought an inelastic support base, points to something very significant. Many people did not like the way she threw her weight around; her ostentation; the dozens of statues she is erecting in her likeness, her assumption that even if she did nothing to serve it further, history was waiting for her. Others did not like Narendra Modi. Yet others, Prakash Karat. Arrogance of style. Arrogance of ambition. The arrogance of neglecting the people. All of this was punished by the voter.

Narendra Modi has marginalised all possible opposition within the BJP, and sidelined the RSS, Bajrang Dal and VHP. They cannot really muddy things for him easily anymore. He is a man looking for power and he has used and discarded them. He has a solid support base in West Gujarat and among middle-class Gujaratis, so there is no question of him fading away, but this election doubts have been planted about his capacity to emerge as a pan-Indian leader. He was billed as a star campaigner for the BJP, but the Indian voter has sent back a strong message scaling him down.

Controversial leaders rarely make it to the top job in India. Modi is determined not to talk of communities, determined not to apologise or even make a gesture towards the Muslim community to atone for the sins of Gujarat 2002. His refrain is that he is the leader of five-and-a-halfcrore Gujaratis, implying he is also the leader of Muslims. But this election should teach him some lessons in humility and modesty. It should give him some access to the language of politics in India. He will learn his lesson. Indian politics has taught humility to lots of people from Indira Gandhi to Mayawati. It will teach humility to Narendra Modi also.

Unfortunately, there is a big similarity between Prakash Karat and Narendra Modi — however unpleasant that thought might be. They are both men who do not understand the wisdom of accommodation and cannot stomach the dilution of ideology.

Like Modi and Mayawati, this election has scaled down the arrogance of Prakash Karat, but the debacle of the Left Front points to a deeper malaise.

IN BENGAL, the party had been in power too long. In a society like ours, when any political party is on an ascendant, all gangs, thugs and extortionists gravitate towards that party. In UP, this mafia element was first attached to the Congress; then it moved to the BJP; then the SP; then the BSP, mirroring their rising political graphs. In Bengal, 32 years into power, all anti-social elements had become entrenched within the CPM. The party's coercive might was enormous. In village after village, people from other parties were prevented from campaigning. That arrogance and control has not loosened very much, but it has started to crack. In the long run, I think Prakash Karat has done a lot of good to Bengal. These three decades of continuous rule had rotted the system to the core. If you miss power once in a while — however bad the Opposition may be — it keeps people and parties on their toes.

(For instance, I believe it is good the BJP got a shot at winning power at the Centre one time. Not only did it limber up the Congress, it also allowed the BJP to get a sense that it can come to power if it gets its formulas right. This is very important to keep the rabid fringe like VHP, Bajrang Dal and Shiv Sena in check. When you have legitimate power, you don't have to use street power. You rein them in because it's counter-productive and you want respectability.)

But criminality and arrogance is not the only reason for the Left Front's rout in Bengal and Kerala. The trouble is, their kind of Leninism has not survived anywhere in the world except in Cuba, Bengal and Kerala. Chandan Mitra would add tartly, "And the People's Republic of Jawaharlal Nehru University." This ideology has such an Edwardian ring to it, I am surprised it even captivated so many in India. The point is, this sense of a vanguard of the proletariat, this whole position is protected by middle-class activists. This is why despite 32 years in power, the truth is that the kind of revolutionary changes in social structures that have swept across India have not even touched West Bengal. Everything there is still controlled by the upper castes, and in some senses, it is the most casteist society in India. West Bengal is one state in India, for instance, where you cannot even dream of having a dalit chief minister. In contrast, in south India, the whole thing has opened up. So much new energy has been released. But has Bengal produced an AR Rahman? Or his guru, Illayaraja? Genius flowering from the bottom of society. Such release of energy from the non-brahminic castes has absolutely no parallel in Bengal.

There is little hope that the churn of this defeat will bring in any fresh thought into Marxism in Bengal. It cannot, because this is the last remnant of a colonial culture. That is why our Marxists are locked into their textbooks. That is why they haven't picked up anything from Latin American Marxism or European Marxism, that is why there has been no new indigenous innovation.

In such an intellectual world, rethinking comes through only two things: death and retirement. Once people start retiring and dying, a new generation will come in. Then it will be easy. They will just not bother with what has gone before. Ideas like this die out of neglect and carelessness, not through dramatic confrontation.

The other important trend this election has thrown up, is the return of support to larger national level parties. One could read this as the start of a significant course correction. With the extreme proliferation of smaller parties and interest groups, perhaps the fragmentation of electoral power has stopped yielding dividends.

Voters have realised it is best to allow larger parties to come to power at the Centre.

The interesting thing is, though the pitch has been scaled down, one cannot read this election result as a post-Mandal era of politics. Many of the Congress' traditional vote banks — the dalits and Muslims in UP, for instance — had moved away from the Congress to more 'specialist parties': the dalits moved to the BSP, the Muslims to Mulayam Singh. In Bihar, they moved towards Lalu. The attraction of these parties was that, being smaller, they were much more captive to the demands of their vote base. In a large, national party like the Congress, others' demands checkmated your demands. Ironically, the movement back towards the Congress is a sign that the specialist parties like SP and BSP have become too big and bloated with ambition, and so less responsive to their vote banks. In effect, the Congress is now the new small party trying to build a new support base. People feel it might be more responsive to their needs.

There are other reasons why it would be premature to read this election as a post-Mandal era. In India, except in very small, modern, urban pockets, the unit of mobility is not the individual; the unit of mobility is caste. The lowest common denominator for any party decision on their choice of candidates is caste — all other considerations of aptitude and intention come after that. In fact, we cannot reach a post- Mandal era of politics yet because entering politics from the periphery is still a very crucial instrument in Indian politics.

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Sunday, 24 May 2009

Book Review: Jihadi Terror in Bangladesh - by Khaled Ahmed

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Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web

By Ali Riaz; Routledge 2008; Pp172;
Price £80

Ali Riaz heads the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University and has written before on Islamism in Bangladesh. In this book he gets to the root of what led in 2005 to a countrywide setting off of 450 bombs that signalled the coming into its own of jihadi Islam.

Bangladesh has Harkat-ul Jihad Bangladesh (HUJIB), the Jama'at-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), and the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) as functioning jihadi organisations. These three organisations can be traced to a single network. Others include Hizb-ut-Tawhid, Shahadat-i-Hiqma, and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Reliable data about the militant organisations, particularly the profiles of the activists, are not available, but profiles of the militants arrested since the beginning of 2006 indicate that former participants of the Afghan war and disaffected youth are at the helm of these organisations. The top leaders are thus 'connected' to organisations outside Bangladesh.

Their attacks have traced a uniform pattern, possibly in response to one central directive. They frequently target specific groups: locally prominent NGOs and NGO-run schools, members of the judiciary, women, and so on (p.31), which conforms to the pattern in Pakistan. Violence against the Hindus in Bangladesh after the 2001 Babri Masjid incident is well documented. Beginning in 2002, the Ahmedis were attacked by Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (KN), an umbrella organisation of the Islamist groups. They have begun a campaign to declare Ahmedis non-Muslims, just like Pakistan.

The BD government, instead of clamping down on the perpetrators of these attacks, has succumbed to their pressure and on January 8, 2004, banned all Ahmedi publications. It also allowed this organisation to attack Ahmedi mosques, and seize their properties, while the police and local authorities helped them pull down the signboards of Ahmedi organisations, more or less as in Pakistan, where the Ahmedis have been constitutionally declared non-Muslims. The Ahmedi headquarters in Dhaka was attacked in 1992, and Imam Shah Alam was killed in Jessore in 2003. (p.35)

The Saudi-assisted Ahle Hadith movement became strong in the 1980s and Bangladesh saw a mushrooming of the madrassas. Between 1972 and 2004, their growth rate was 73 percent. In May 2004, the police chief in Rajshahi was telling the press that Bangla Bhai was assisting the law enforcers in tracking down the left-wing outlaws. Bangla Bhai was a jihadi veteran from Afghanistan whom Pakistan had facilitated and who was eventually hanged once the civilian governments were removed with the imposition of emergency in 2006.

Bangla Bhai, with hundreds killed and maimed at his hands, gave Bangladesh a bad name in the world. But Bangladesh was on the self-chosen course of degradation together with Pakistan. Pakistan did it under its India-driven policy but Bangladesh did it out of sheer liking for violence under Islam. Others too were chosen for patronage. The case of Mufti Rauf is instructive.

Abdur Rauf went to Afghanistan via Pakistan in 1989 and fought alongside the Taliban until the end of 1992. He became a key organiser of a militant group soon after his return to Bangladesh. By his own admission, he imparted military training to madrassa students as a teacher in Madaripur district for about three years. Later he came into contact with the Rohingya rebels in the south-eastern region. In 1995 he was arrested with 40 other militants from a training camp at Cox's Bazaar but was jailed for only five months (p.52).

Why was Bangladesh soft on terrorists? This is a question all Muslim states have to answer but will not. The question is important because their bias in favour of these terrorists has led to the death of many peaceful citizens.

Geographically, Bangladesh is surrounded almost entirely by India on its eastern western and northern borders, sharing 4,053 km (3,035 miles) of frontier and 193 km (172 miles) of it with Myanmar in the southeast. The Bay of Bengal, shared with India and Myanmar, bounds Bangladesh in the south. Five Indian states border Bangladesh, including four in India's troubled northeast where dozens of militant groups are fighting for full statehood, greater autonomy or independence. (p.62)

Author Riaz writes: "After the 1975 military coup in Bangladesh, a new identity, called Bangladeshi nationalism, was articulated in a manner that portrayed India as an adversary. Over the following 30 years, the situation has worsened as more issues of difference have been added to an already distrustful relationship. There are four sources of boundary conflicts: (1) non-ratification of the 1974 Indo-Bangladesh Land Agreement; (2) non-delineation of maritime boundaries in the Bay of Bengal; (3) ownership of Talpatty Island referred to as New Moore Island; and (4) sharing of river waters that flow from India to Bangladesh."

The book says India organised groups inside Bangladesh and gave them material support to conduct a low-intensity conflict till 1997. The military regimes in Bangladesh retaliated by resurrecting a policy begun by the Pakistani government of providing shelter and support to the insurgent groups of Indian north-eastern states (p.63). Bangladeshi masses converted to hardline attitudes towards the non-Muslims after the BJP arose in India and in 1992 caused the Babri Masjid crisis. This helped the Islamists argue that the right course for Muslim-majority Bangladesh would be to pursue an Islamist path. The secularist Awami League failed to present an alternative vision which would underscore national sovereignty, and address Dhaka's concerns vis-à-vis India.

It further says: "The Indo-Bangladesh fence-construction project has progressed slowly and, to date only about half of the border has been fenced. Bangladesh authorities allege that Indians are violating the 1975 border guidelines which clearly state that any type of defensive work cannot be carried out within 150 yards of the zero line." (p.64)

Relations with Burma went bad too. Between late 1977 and May 1978, about 200,000 Burmese Arakanese Rohingyas crossed the border and took shelter in Bangladesh as a result of persecution by the Burmese authorities (p.65). Later the Arakanese turned up in Karachi madrassas.

The above-mentioned terrorist organisation HUJIB, run by Shafiqur Rehman who had returned from jihad in Afghanistan, moved to the Chittagong Hill Tracts to help the Rohingya refugees. Subsequently, HUJIB militants acknowledged the existence of various training camps in Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar districts based on madrassas established with foreign funds.

Foreign funds had also gone to the Naga rebels in India's northeast. When the Indian army went after the Nagas in 1958 the most prominent leader of the Naga independence movement — Angami Zapu Phizo — fled to the then East Pakistan. Phizo was cordially received by Pakistani intelligence officials who helped go on to London to internationalise the Naga demand for an independent state, while his followers began receiving military training inside East Pakistan. (p.66)

Author Riaz reveals that "the Pakistani military intelligence agency had set up a Coordinating Bureau to supervise its covert operation in Nagaland; and that China began providing active support to the Naga movement in 1966 and military training to the rebels in 1967. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) continued to receive support from Pakistani intelligence agencies even up to the 1990s." (p.67)

In Bangladesh, the presence of Indian intelligence operatives within Bangladesh is a matter of common discussion. RAW has been present and active in Bangladesh even when it was still East Pakistan, although RAW has always denied the allegations. Bangladeshi intelligence is ill-equipped. In December 2002, three army officers and a number of civilians were arrested from the border districts of north-eastern Sylhet and northern Mymensingh for spying for the Indians (p.78).

By 2003, the presence of the ISI in Bangladesh became so conspicuous that the foreign minister of Bangladesh acknowledged it to the press: "ISI and Al Qaeda have their networks throughout the world and they might have their activities in our country too," commented Morshed Khan on September 19, 2003. It should be noted that Khan had previously denied any ISI presence in Bangladesh. For example, on November 28, 2002, Khan described Indian allegations about the presence of Al Qaeda elements and the ISI in Bangladesh as "unfounded and malicious". (p.79)

Riaz writes: "Ostensibly, the ISI's strategy was not only to help the existing north-eastern Indian insurgents but also to build other groups who would be able to keep the border regions unstable, provoke the Indian authorities, and drive a wedge between India and Bangladesh. RAW, on the other hand, was trying to beat the ISI." (p.79)

The Afghan connection of the Bangladeshi militants is important because it facilitated the organisational structure of the militants without being known outside Bangladesh. Although it is widely known that the radical Islamists who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan alongside the mujahideen have been incorporated into the Islamic movements throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, their impact in other parts of the world, particularly in countries like Bangladesh, is understudied.

Beginning in 1984, a 'volunteer corps' was organised to join the jihad in Afghanistan. Some 3,000 people under the leadership of Abdur Rahman Faruki travelled in several batches to Afghanistan to fight alongside other volunteer mujahideen. Over the following four years at least 24 of them died and ten became disabled. In 1988, a delegation of self-proclaimed ulema too visited Afghanistan. (p.82)

As in Pakistan, Islamist terrorists attack the NGOs in Bangladesh. Throughout the 1980s, NGOs, especially through their micro-credit programmes for poor rural women and free primary education programmes as an alternative to madrassas, irked the Islamists. The Islamists responded with critiques of the NGOs, portraying them as aided by 'Jews and Christian conspirators who undermine Islamic cultural values, spread atheism, convert people Christianity and try to create an aggressively feminist, impure society'. There are helped by Rabita Al-Alam Al-Islami, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RJHS), etc. (p.83) *

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BDR Massacre: Summary of Government investigation report

Shahiduzzaman

The committee the government formed to investigate the February 25-26 rebellion and killing in the Bangladesh Rifles headquarters in Dhaka has recommended 'field general court martial' to ensure quick and exemplary punishment of the perpetrators.

The 11-member committee, headed by retired secretary Anis-uz Zaman Khan, in its 309-page report cited grievances of the BDR soldiers against their officers from the army as probable causes for the rebellion.

Although the grievances were not that strong so as to stage such a big killing, some forces might have used the situation to break the chain of command and make the border force inoperative. The committee, however, did not mention anywhere in the report even the possibility of links between the incident and militant forces.

The army's 20-member court of inquiry, which submitted its report to the army chief on May 10, had mentioned grievances of the soldiers as the reason for the rebellion and it found no militant link with the incident.

The government investigation committee recommended action against the people who failed to pre-empt the situation and also against the people who failed to take instant action after the incident.

Although the report is yet to be made public, New Age could obtain a copy of the summery of the report. The committee in the report said the pre- and post-rebellion analysis depicted that the incident was ' well-planned.'
 
Intelligence agencies National Security Intelligence and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence had sent reports to the Special Security Force before the prime minister's February 23 visit to the BDR headquarters, making only some routine recommendations and without mentioning any odd situation there, the report said.
 
Seventy-four people  including 57 army officers, a retired army personnel, wives of two army officers, 9 BDR soldiers, 3 passers-by, an army soldier and a police constable were killed in the 'mutiny and carnage,' according to the report submitted on Thursday to the home affairs minister, Sahara Khatun.
 
Bodies of two army officers still remain to be identified. The officers killed include a major general, a brigadier general, 16 colonels, 10 lieutenant colonels, 23 majors, 2 captains and 4 officers of the army medical corps.

The report also suggested formation of a national crisis management committee to tackle such issues in future and to immediately raise a force with members from the Armed Forces to check recurrence of such incidents.

The committee suggested reorganisation of the Bangladesh Rifles, formation of a national intelligence coordination committee and relocation of businesses for the intelligence agencies as long-term measures.

Strongly criticising the role of the media during and after the rebellion, the committee called for formulation of a code of conduct for the print and electronic media during national security crisis. It said the electronic media on many occasions had tarnished the image of the army and at times instigated many negative issues in news and talk shows without knowing the whole matter.

The committee also suggested updating laws of the Bangladesh Rifles and other paramilitary forces.

The committee consisted of the law secretary, BDR director general, representatives of the Prime Minister's Office, cabinet division, army, navy and air force, police, home ministry and the judge advocate general recommended that the military, paramilitary forces and other law enforcement agencies should not be involved in programmes such as Operation Dal Bhat.
 
The committee found that the rebels had killed the officers, including the director general and the deputy director general, looted the armoury, burnt 16 vehicles belonging to the officers, vandalised 18 others, looted the house of the officers and carried out physical assault on the officers families during the rebellion.

One hundred and thirty-three army officers, including 86 of the BDR headquarters and 47 others who came from different districts on the occasion of the BDR Week, were present when the soldiers took up arms against their offices on February 25.

The officers who survived the killing include 3 lieutenant colonels, 14 majors, 15 officers of the army medical corps, 5 majors of the Operation Dal Bhat, a major who came for the annual parade, 5 majors who came to distribute invitation cards, 7 majors who came to receive awards, 8 regional officers and 14 civilian officers.

The report said the committee for the sake of investigation considered it essential to interrogate the heads of some organisations and some important people and to gather information from the intelligence agencies, but the committee failed to do so for lack of cooperation.

As a result, the main perpetrators of the rebellion and killing could not be identified and the main reason and the motive for the incident could not be found for lack of proper information and enough proof, the report said.

The committee during the investigation requested the National Security Intelligence, Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, Rapid Action Battalion, Criminal Investigation Department and Special Branch to provide information and proofs they gathered in their professional analysis, but the agencies did not extended the expected cooperation.

As the committee lacked tools and techniques to interrogate the suspects and unearth the truth, none of the people brought before the committee provided any important information or proof.

The committee believed finding out the reasons and motive of the rebellion and identification of the people behind the incident was difficult and time-consuming.

The investigation committee with the help of an assisting organisation found that many BDR soldiers and other civilians were involved in planning the February 25-26 killing, looting and other crimes in the BDR headquarters.
 
Quoting the assisting organisation which was not named, the committee in the report said the plan had been carried out for about two months and the perpetrators held several meetings till the incident.

Habildar Munir, sepoy Tarek and Ayub, assistant lance nayek Sayeedur and 25 or 26 other BDR soldiers before the December 2008 general elections met Barrister Fazle Noor Taposh, now a member of parliament. The Prime Coaching Centre's owner Zakir was also attended the meetings. The investigation found three or four days after the elections, some of the BDR soldiers had met Taposh in his house, Sky Star, where the newly elected lawmaker said that it would not be possible to consider any of their demands but the one related to rations.

In the middle of February, two deputy assistant directors, civilian Zakir and 10 or 12 soldiers also met lawmaker Sheikh Selim who told them that their demands were matters of the home affairs ministry.

They then tried to meet the home minister and when they could not get any direction from political figures, they planned their next course of action and held a number of meetings in different places, including Zakir's coaching centre near Gate 5 of the headquarters.

The committee took 10 things into consideration, including trying to find whether there was any other conspiracy behind the rebellion and killing or any other force or group from outside had given support.

The committee also tried to find whether it was an isolated incident, what the demands of the BDR soldiers were and how much they were justified, whether there were any efforts to meet the demands and whether the rebellion and killing a was a case of venting their grievances.

The investigation also tried to figure out the beneficiaries of the incident and its long-term effects.

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Proposed BDR Restructuring: Resentment and anxieties

Borders guards are working in the frontiers with anxiety and disappointment over the government's move to restructure the Bangladesh Rifles after the February 25- 26 rebellion n its headquarters in Dhaka.
 
Spot visits to frontiers such as Boikari and Bhomra in Satkhira, Benapole in Jessore, Moghalhat, Durgapur and Baniyatari in Lalmonirhat and Tamabil, Shreepur and Jaintapur in Sylhet on Thursday showed that border guards in the areas were anxious and bereft of hope.

Although the guards claimed borders were secure, local residents alleged that cross-border smuggling had increased in recent days as the BDR soldiers were guarding the borders amid anxiety.

The visits also found that nayek subedars were commanding soldiers in the border outposts and subedars in company offices.

Some nayek subedars and subedars told New Age they were commanding the soldiers in guarding the borders at the directive of their officers in the army. The officers sometimes visit the outposts and company offices, they said.

Expressing disappointment at the government move for the BDR reorganisation, the border guards said they were anxious about their jobs and future after they came to know of the move from media reports and their fellows.

The Bangladesh Rifles has become an icon of national security for the performance of the soldiers since Bangladesh's war of independence in 1971, they said, adding the paramilitary force should not be destroyed in the name of reorganisation.

They also differed with the views expressed by some ministers about taking help from neighbouring countries for the reorganisation of the Bangladesh Rifles. Such a move will be disastrous for the national security, they said.

It will be better not to change the name, uniform and the logo of the force, they said, adding that the people involved in the rebellion and the killing should be punished in an open, fair trial, but innocent soldiers should in no way be harassed.

They also observed the rebellion had resulted from longstanding grievances of soldiers and such grievances should be addressed properly to stop the recurrence of any such incident.

The New Age correspondent in Khulna said a soldier, working in the Bhomra frontier, said, 'We are patriots. We have proved it by working in remote frontiers. So the Bangladesh Rifles should not be destroyed in the name of reorganisation.'

'As members of a disciplined force, we have nothing to do but to follow all the government decisions,' said a havildar working in the Satkhira border.

Qualitative changes can be brought about in the Bangladesh Rifles, but it would be better not to change the name, uniform, logo and moto as the force has a long, glorious past, he said, adding the people involved in the rebellion and killing should be punished.

A nayek subedar said they were worried about their jobs and future.

The correspondent in Sylhet said the border guards in the outposts of Tamabil, Shreepur and Jaintapur seemed anxious.

When they were asked about their condition, they said the countrymen knew well about the situation they were facing.

A soldier said, 'We hope the government finally will make a positive decision about the Bangladesh Rifles.'

Another soldier said they had lost their moral strength after the rebellion and the government move to restructure the Bangladesh Rifles. 'We want to serve the nation as we earlier did'
 
Help from neighbouring countries for BDR reorganisation will not be wise 'as they are our counterparts,' he said.

Tamabil company commander nayek subedar Zaynal Abedin and Jaintapur border outpost commander nayek subedar Younus claimed that the frontiers were secure.

Local residents of frontier upazilas such as Companiganj, Jaintapur, Goainghat, Kanaighat and Jakiganj, however, said the guards could not discharge their responsibilities properly as they were anxious about their future.

A lcoal trader of Shantinagar near the Sangrampunji BDR camp at Tambil, said the guards could not work properly for which goods smuggling increased.

According to sources in the Bangladesh Rifles, officials of the Sylhet sector headquarters are not so active in overseeing the activities of border guards in frontiers.

Operation officer of the 21 Rifles Battalion under the Sylhet sector headquarters, Major Benjir, however, claimed their supervision of the border situation and efforts to curb smuggling remained normal.

The correspondent in Jessore said the solders at the Benapole check post were performing their duties anxiously being panicked about their future.

A number of Benapole port policemen said the border guards were panicked about being arrested, although the guards doing their duties in the frontiers were not involved in the rebellion.

The BDR soldiers said they were worried about their job as the government initiated a move to restructure the Bangladesh Riles.

A soldier on guard near the border said, 'We have noting to do, but to hope that what the government does may be good for us.'
 
Another soldier said, 'What can we expect but that the government should not do anything to the soldiers who were not involved in the rebellion?'
 
There are 13 BDR outposts along the Benapole border where about 80 solders perform their duties.

A labour leader of the area told New Age all the BDR soldiers along the border were panicked about their future.

The correspondent in Lalmonirhat said almost all of the soldiers on guard along the border of the district had expressed their dissatisfaction at BDR reorganisation.

Some solders of the Moghalhat outpost camp in Lalmonirhat seemed worried. A soldier said they were not satisfied at the reorganisation of the Bangladesh Rifles.

Some soldiers at the Durgapur outpost camp at Aditmari and Baniyatari said they were facing problems in border villages after the rebellion as the local residents insulted them.

Change in name, uniform, moto and logo of the Bangladesh Rifles will only add to the insult of the soldiers, they said

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